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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Evidence-Good Cause and the Attorney-Client Privilege
in Shareholder's Suits
The applicability of the attorney-client privilege to corporations has
long been taken for granted.' Surprisingly, however, few cases have ex-
pressly considered the merits of the availability of the privilege to corpora-
tions, and it was not until 1962 that the first major case 2 presenting the
issue was decided. In Garner v. Wolfinbarger,8 a shareholder's derivative
suit, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit took advantage of the
flexibility afforded by the paucity of weighty precedent and declined an
automatic extension of the privilege-originally created for the protection
of individuals-to the modem corporation.4
In Garner, several stockholders of First American Life Insurance
Company of Alabama brought a class action against the corporation,
various directors and controlling persons alleging violations of federal and
state security laws and common law fraud.' The plaintiffs sought to
recover the purchase price which they and others had paid for their stock
in First American." Schweitzer had served as attorney for the corpora-
tion in connection with the first issuance of First American stock, and later
'United States v. Louisville and Nashville R.R., 236 U.S. 318, 336 (1915);
Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855 (8th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
833 (1956); Belanger v. Alton Box Board Co., 180 F.2d 87, 93-94 (7th Cir.
1950); CAB v. Air Transp. Ass'n, 201 F. Supp. 318 (D.D.C. 1961).
' Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 207 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Ill.),
rev'd, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963). The lower
court's decision denying absolutely the assertion of the privilege against the share-
holders brought a flurry of criticism. See, e.g., Note, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 551 (1963);
Note, 51 GEo. L.J. 399 (1963); Note, 76 HAv. L. Rav. 655 (1963); Note, 37
N.Y.U.L. Rnv. 955 (1962).
'430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970).
'There are two other interesting questions involved in this case not dealt with
in this note: first, whether state law dealing with privilege is substantive for
purposes of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (see Wright, Procedural
Reform: Its Limitations and Its Future, 1 GA. L. REv. 563, 571-74 (1967); Com-
ment, California Law as to Scope of Attorney-Client Privilege Held Applicable I
Federal Non-Diversity Proceedings.-Baird v. Koerner (9th Cir. 1960), 49 CALiF.
L. REv. 382 (1961)); and second, assuming that state law is applicable, should
English common law control instead of state statutes dealing with attorney-client
privilege (see Comment, Attorney-Client Privilege in Shareholders' Suits, 69
CoLum. L. REv. 309, 314 (1969)).
'430 F.2d at 1095.
'The shareholders also claimed damages derivatively on behalf of the corpora-
tion, but the district court apparently made no distinction between the two types of
action. 280 F. Supp. at 1018. Arguably, the capacity in which the shareholders sue
is irrelevant to the issue of whether the privilege should be available.
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had become its president. On deposition, Schweitzer was asked several
questions concerning advice given by him to the corporation about various
aspects of the issuance and sale of the stock and related matters.7 All
questions related to times at which Schweitzer acted as attorney, before he
became an officer of the company, and before the suit was filed." Both the
corporation, through its counsel, and Schweitzer himself asserted that the
attorney-client privilege barred him from revealing the communications
between him and the corporation. The court of appeals vacated the dis-
trict court's summary disallowance of the privilege claim and held that
the attorney-client privilege is available to a corporate client-subject,
The shareholders also sought discovery of several related documents, and the
attorney-client privilege was claimed as to them. 430 F.2d at 1096. Assuming the
attorney-client privilege were not made available to corporations, one possible
area of confusion would involve distinguishing what is "work product" from what
would have been privileged under the attorney-client rule. This distinction would
gain a new significance since "work product" would be available only if the require-
ments of the Hickman v. Taylor rule were met, while other communications would
be available without restriction. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). Judge
Campbell, in his decision in Radiant Burners, recognized a need to distinguish
between "work product," which he felt was legitimately protected, and material sub-
ject to the attorney-client privilege. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n,
207 F. Supp. 771, 776 (N.D. Ill. 1962).
In view of the fact that Schweitzer soon became president of First American,
some question is presented as to whether he was acting in the capacity of business
adviser rather than counsel. The privilege does not exist, for example, where the
attorney was acting in capacity of corporate director. United States v. Vehicular
Parking, Ltd., 52 F. Supp. 751, 753-54 (D. Del. 1943). The line is not easily drawn,
particularly when, as often happens, the attorney performs duties in both capacities.
Whether to approach the communication between the corporation and the lawyer
as an individual communication or to determine if the preponderance of his
duties is the giving of legal advice has been the choice confronting the courts in
attempting to establish a rule for deciding in which capacity the attorney acts.
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950);
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 121 F. Supp. 792 (D. Del.
1954); American Cyanamid Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 211 F. Supp. 85
(D. Del. 1962). Approaching each communication individually and allowing the
judge to decide, on the facts of each case, in which capacity the attorney was
acting is to be preferred. See Simon, The Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to
Corporations, 65 YALn L.J. 952, 969 (1955); Annot., 98 A.L.R.2d 228, 247-53
(1964). The court in Garner did not deal with this issue, however, stating in the
facts that all communications involved were made to Schweitzer in his capacity
as counsel before he became a director.
8 The fact that Schweitzer was serving as house counsel rather than an in-
dependent practitioner complicates the decision on capacity due to the routine assign-
ment of both business and legal tasks to one in such a position. The court expressly
refused to find this determinative, which is probably the better view. Georgia-
Pacific Plywood Co. v. United States Plywood Corp., 18 F.R.D. 463 (S.D.N.Y.
1956). Not to allow this privilege would be to discriminate against the larger corpo-
rations, since they alone have the resources and work load necessary to retain house
counsel.
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however, to the right of the stockholders to show cause why it should not
be invoked.
The attorney-client privilege as applied to individuals is one of the
most favored of all privileges. Although some commentators are taking a
long, hard look at this privilege in its modem context, 10 it is generally felt
that the impediment to fact finding is outweighed by the benefits of franker
disclosure in the lawyer's office." Nevertheless,
the privilege remains an exception to the general duty to disclose. Its
benefits are all indirect and speculative; its obstruction is plain and
concrete.... It is worth preserving for the sake of a general policy but
it is nonetheless an obstacle to the investigation of the truth. It ought
to be strictly confined within the narrowest possible limits, consistent
with the logic of its principle.
12
It was with these considerations in mind that the court in Garner ap-
proached the attorney-client privilege. Previous decisions dealing with
the availability of the privilege to corporations were concerned largely
with various legalistic and somewhat conceptual arguments.3 Thus it has
been asserted that since the corporation is a legal entity, it should be able
to claim the privilege; however, it has been argued in retort that since the
corporation is a creature of the state, rather than an individual for whom
the privilege was historically designed,' 4 it must be given the privilege
by statute. The attorney-client privilege has also been analogized to the
privilege against self-incrimination, 5 which is denied to corporations
' One commonly used statement of the requirements for the attorney-client
privilege is found in Professor Wigmore's treatise:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional
legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to
that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his in-
stance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal
adviser, (8) except the protection be waived.
8 J. WIGMoP, EVIDENCE § 2292 (rev. ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as WiaMonm].
1°See, e.g., C. McCoRMIcK, EVIDENCE § 91, at 182 (1954). "If one were legis-
lating for a new commonwealth, without history or customs, it would be hard to
maintain that a privilege for lawyer-client communications would facilitate more
than it would obstruct the administration of justice." See also Gardner, A Re-
Evaluation of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 8 VILL. L. Riv. 279 (1963). Radin,
Lawyer and Client, 16 CALIF. L. REV. 487 (1928).
" C. McCoRMIcK, EVIDENCE § 91, at 181 (1954).
1 8 W ORE § 2291, at 554, cited by the court in Garner. 430 F.2d at 1100.
8 The most notable of these is Judge Campbell's decision in Radiant Burners,
Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 207 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Ill. 1962).
1"Id. at 773.
The bases of the attorney-client privilege and the privilege against self-
incrimination are completely different. Briefly, while the former is to encourage
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because of its personal nature." A further, example of th mechanistic,
conceptual approach concerns the confidential nature of privileged com-
munications. To be privileged, communications must have been made in
confidence. The directors of a corporation, who usually are* the agents
claiming the privilege for it, often have business interests outside the
corporation. Thus they are not likely to preserve the confidentiality of a
communication if disclosure would benefit their outside interest. There-
fore, it has been argued that since few communications are confidential, the
privilege should be disallowed as to all.'1 Furthermore, it also has been
asserted that when a public corporation is formed, confidentiality should
be surrendered in favor of giving the stockholders access to communica-
tions relating to the management of the corporation.,
All these approaches, however, serve only as a peg upon which to hang
a decision after the judge has balanced the circumstances involved. But
as Judge Godbold said in Garner, "[6] onceptualistic phrases .. .are not
useful tools of analysis."'" And even though many of these ingenious
arguments are indicative of the basic problems involved in an extension
of the privilege, it would be preferable to deal straightforwardly with those
problems. In Garner the conflicting policies are set forth, as are the
particular circumstances to be appraised in striking a balance between a
corporation's right to invoke the privilege and the stockholder's right to
reach the information.
Certain policies historically set forth as justifications for granting the
privilege to individuals readily lend themselves to application within the
corporate setting. Due to the complexity of guiding the corporation
through the growing maze of state and federal regulations, the corporation
as directed by management is in need of legal counsel.2" It is in the interest
of all concerned that management be encouraged to seek counsel without
free disclosure between the attorney and client, the latter is a personal right granted
by the constitution. Thus the analogy is quite imperfect. See Comment, The
Lawyer-Client Privilege: Its Application to Corporations, the Role of Ethics, and
Its Possible Curtailment, 65 Nw. U.L. Rnv. 235, 241 (1961).10United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
1*Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 207 F. Supp. 771, 774 (N.D.
Ill. 1962).
's Id. at 775.
° 430 F.2d at 1101.
."American Cyanamid Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 211 F Supp. 85, 88 n.12
(D. Del. 1962); A.B. Dick Co. v. Marr, 95 F. Supp. 83, 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1950);
Comment, Evidence: Federal Rides of Civil Procedure: Attorney-Client Privilege
as Applied to Corporations: Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 207 F.
Supp. 771 (N.D. Ill. 1962) ; Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp.
483 (E.D. Pa. 1962), 48 COZNELL L.Q. 551, 564 (1963).
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hesitation.21 Therefore, the encouragement of freedom of disclosure, the
main justification for the availability of the privilege to the individual,
should also be the main justification when a corporation is involved. 1
A second justification for the extention of the privilege is also related
to the effectiveness of corporate operation. Management should be free
to exercise their sound judgment without being harrassed by a few dis-
satisfied shareholders, who in bad faith seek to disrupt the smooth opera-
tions of the company at the expense of the other shareholders. 2 The cost
of litigating or settling these "strike suits" is, of course, born by all the
shareholders of the corporation. A strong public policy dictates that the
dissident few should not be given an added incentive to initiate such actions
by allowing them to discover what has been disclosed in confidence to
counsel in an effort to manage the corporation more effectively. This con-
sideration is not found in the situation involving an individual and lends
strong support to those who advocate that the privilege be made available
to corporations.
Nevertheless, the policy of allowing full discovery of essential facts
weighs heavily against the granting of the privilege to corporations, per-
haps even more so than in the individual attorney-client situation." Man-
agement already has the ability to obscure much of what they do and yet
remain within legitimate managerial practices.24 Allowing this privilege
gives the corporation an additional method to effectuate this zone of
silence.25 Although it is true that the mere presence of an attorney at a
board meeting, for example, would never shield what transpired there,"
the corporation nevertheless would have considerable leeway in which to
conceal important information under the guise of privilege.
21See text at note 11 supra.
2As the court in Garner said:
Due regard must be paid to the interest of nonparty stockholders, which may
be affected by impinging on the privilege, sometimes injuriously (though not
necessarily so--in some situations shareholders who are not plaintiffs may
benefit). The corporation is vulnerable to suit by shareholders whose in-
terests or intention may be inconsistent with those of other shareholders,
even others constituting a majority.
430 F.2d at 1101 n.17.
• See text at note 12 supra.
By utilizing complicated organizational structures, vast number of agents, and
advantageous accounting procedures, management can be very successful in hiding
from the lay investor exactly what it is doing.
" See Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 207 F. Supp. 771, 774
(N.D. Ill. 1962), quoting Simon, The Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to
Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 953, 955-56 (1956).
" With regard to privileged written communications, see Radiant Burners, Inc.
v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 324 (7th Cir. 1963).
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A further consideration not present in the individual attorney-client
privilege situation involves the special relationship of corporate manage-
ment to the stockholders.27 As Judge Godbold said in Garner, "it must
be borne in mind that management does not manage for itself and that
the beneficiaries of its action are the stockholders."2' This fiduciary
relationship has been the basis of attempts to apply the joint-client excep-
tion to the attorney-client privilege to corporations.2 The basis for this
exception is that parties jointly seeking legal advice have a common in-
terest, and therefore do not intend the communication to be privileged
in a suit by one against the other. It is arguable that this exception does
not apply in the corporate situation because the identity of interest is
missing. As the court in Garner recognized, the corporation and manage-
ment may have interests adverse to the shareholders.30
The special duty that management owes to the shareholders has
ramifications broader than its use merely as a basis for applying the joint-
client exception. It is, in fact, the most compelling argument against
making the privilege available to corporations. In view of management's
general fiduciary capacity, perhaps it would be preferable as a matter of
public policy to allow the decisions as well as the information upon which
they were based to stand on their merits instead of permitting manage-
ment to hide behind the attorney-client privilege. 1 This is particularly
applicable in the Garner case since the communications with counsel dealt
with what possibly was criminal activity. "To grant the corporate man-
agement plenary assurance of secrecy for opinions received is to encourage
it to disregard with impunity the advice sought.
'3 2
'See H. HENN, CoRponATIONS § 235 (2d ed. 1970).
28430 F.2d at 1101.
'When "the same attorney acts for two parties having a common interest,
and each party communicates with him [,] .... they are not privileged in a con-
troversy between the two original parties." 8 WIGMoaM § 2312.
0430 F.2d at 1101. One problem resulting from this fiduciary relationship is
that funds of the corporation are used to compensate counsel utilized by management.
At first blush, it appears that the shareholders are bearing the burden of com-
pensation, yet are denied access to the information thereby attained. This seem-
ingly unjust result is easily understood by viewing these expenditures as necessary
for the effective operation of the business. The alternative would be to force
management to obtain private counsel, but that would be unduly burdensome and
the cost would ultimately be borne by the shareholders in the form of increased
salaries. See Comment, The Attorney-Client Privilege in Shareholders' Suits, 69
CoLUm. L. Rlv. 309, 319 (1969).
31430 F.2d at 1101.
32 430 F.2d at 1102. "It has been agreed from the beginning that the privilege
can not avail to protect the client in concerting with the attorney a crime or other
evil enterprise. This is for the logically sufficient reason that no such enterprise
1971]
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. In Garner, the court applied Professor Wigmore's test requiring a
balancing of "injury" against "benefit derived"31 8 to determine whether the
privilege should be granted. Under that test a balance already delicate
when the client is an individual is made even more so because of the danger
of abuse34 in the corporate setting and the special fiduciary role of
corporate management. 5 The presence or absence of a single fact or cir-
cumstance may be crucial when the balancing test is used. On the other
hand, a rigid rule either allowing or disallowing the privilege in the
corporate situation would foreclose taking the crucial fact into considera-
tion and might well lead to an inequitable result. Obviously this criticism
is mollified to a certain extent by judicially imposed restrictions on the
application of ari absolute rule. 6 But even with these restrictions, neither
absolute rule has the flexibility necessary to deal effectively with this
delicate balance. It is here-as well as in the refusal to base the privilege
falls within the just scope of the relation between legal adviser and client."
8 WIGM oE § 2298, at 572. The shareholders' complaint alleged that the First
American Prospectus--carrying Schweitzer's name, and about which Schweitzer
had been consulted-failed to disclose the price actually paid by one of First
American's directors for shares of stock and take-out agreements guaranteeing
certain directors a profit. Reply Brief For Appellants-Petitioners and Cross-
Appellees at 6, Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970). Arguably
then, the court could have-found that the privilege was not applicable because
Schweitzer was consulted as to illegal acts or fraud. Instead, the court used this
merely as one factor to be considered in deciding whether the privilege should
apply.
"The court cited Wigrnore's four requirements for the establishment of any
privilege: -
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that will not be
disclosed. (2) This element of confidentiality 'must be essential to the full
and satisfactory maintenance of the relationship between the parties. (3)
The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to
be sedulously fostered. (4) The injury that would inure to the relation by
the disclosure of the communications must be be greater than the benefit
thereby gained for the correct disposal ,of litigation.
As applied to the attorney-client privilege, "all four conditions [were] present
with the only condition open to any dispute being the fourth." 430 F.2d at 1100,
citing 8 WIGMORE § 2285, at 527-28.
" See text at note 25 supra.
or See text at note 28 supra.
"E.g., Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 207 F. Supp. 771, 775-76
(N.D. Ill. 1962) ("trade secrets" as well as "work product" should be privileged);
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 360 (D. Mass. 1950)
(strict confidentiality requirement); Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa. 1962) (only those in a control position may claim the
privilege for the corporation); Grant v. United States, 227 U.S. 74, 79 (1913)
(regular business documents not privileged); see Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio
Corp. of America, 121 F. Supp. 792 (D. Del. 1954); see Comment, The Lawyer-
Client Privilege: Its Application to Corporations, The Role of Ethics, and It.
Possible Curtailment, 56 Nw. U.L. REv. 235, 241-44 (1961).
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on a conceptual, mechanistic argument-that the court in Garner strikes
out on a new approach.
3 7
[W]here the corporation is in suit against its stockholders oi charges
of acting inimically to stockholder interests, protection of those interests
as well as those of the corporation and of the public require that the
availability of the privilege be subject to the right of the stockholders
to show cause why it should not be invoked in the particular instance.38
That the attorney-client privilege in the corporate setting is still viable is
expressly accepted by the court. Furthermore, the court rejected the
argument that the fiduciary relationship is in itself a sufficient basis for
denial." More is needed, and it is expressed in terms of "good cause."
It is the utilization of "good cause" that gives the Garner decision
its flexibility. The decision sets out several largely self-explanatory factors
necessary for "good cause." 4 The general import behind the major cat-
egory is the prevention of the "strike suit." If many shareholders are in-
volved in a suit, and a large percentage of stock is represented, it is un-
likely that the suit is for nuisance value only. The nature of the claim of
the shareholders is also relevant. If the claim is obviously colorable, a
court will be less likely to refuse the privilege than if fraud or criminal
conduct is involved. In the latter situation public policy would also dictate
that the privilege not be granted. Furthermore, the burden should be on
the shareholder to show that the information is necessary and its avail-
ability from other sources is limited. One of the main justifications for
granting the attorney-client privilege is that only the attorney is silenced;
the client is still available for questioning on all matters other than the
communication itself.4" However', in Garner, for example, several of the
people involved in the alleged wrong-doing exercised their privilege against
" The court does try to deemphasize the originality of its approach by com-
paring it to the approach prescribed for inspection of corporate records by stock-
holders. 430 F.2d at 1104 n.21. The main reason for requiring good cause in record
inspection is to prevent nuisance and harassment; this reason is also involved in
the privilege situation, but the main justification for the attorney-client privilege is
the promotion of freedom of disclosure. Thus allowing good cause to be shown to
prevent the invocation of the attorney-client privilege goes further than requiring a
showing of good cause in record inspection and is a new approach.
38 430 F.2d at 1103-04.
30 430 F.2d at 1103.
,0 430 F.2d at 1104.
"' Usually, the allowance of the attorney-client privilege would cause a rela-
tively small loss of relevant information, since the party claiming the privilege
could be called under oath and freely interrogated. Assuming that the claiming
party will not perjure himself, very little could be added by questioning the attorney
as to what was said. See 8 WIGM RE § 2291, at 554.
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self-incrimination, and were unavailable as sources of information. 2 The
final factor in this category deals with whether the information is
identifiable and not just the object of a fishing expedition.
The second and third categories concern the protection of an at-
torney's "work product" and communications with respect to trade secrets.
"Work product" is protected by the decision in Hickman v. Taylor,4"
and trade secrets by the trial judge's use of discretion; nevertheless, the
court in Garner makes it abundantly clear that its decision does not in-
fringe upon these areas. Therefore, communication and advice concerning
the litigation itself will not be made available even if the privilege is held
not to apply. The court in Garner suggests the use of in camera in-
spection to facilitate the examination of the above factors in order to
prevent harm to the interests of the corporation.
As in the application of any flexible rule, the court involved will be
called upon to make a case-by-case application. It has been argued that
to require a court to make this judgment would place an additional burden
on our already overburdened court system,44 whereas an absolute rule
could be easily administered. However, an absolute rule-disallowing
the privilege, for example-could lead to even more of a burden, since
it might encourage stockholders' suits motivated solely by curiosity. It
could also be argued persuasively that a flexible rule would lead to erratic
decisions.4 5 Nevertheless, the benefit of having a flexible rule arguably
outweighs this potential harm. Finally there is the question of whether
management's knowledge that communications made to counsel may later
" Reply Brief for Appellants-Petitioners and Cross-Appellees at 9, Garner v.
Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970).
" 329 U.S. 495 (1947). The court noted that documents in the possession of the
attorney can be beyond the reach of the opposing party either because of the in-
vocation of the attorney-client privilege or because it is a product of the attorney's
preparation for the litigation. Id. at 508-10. The latter is protected for reasons
wholly different from the policies behind the attorney-client privilege. "Work
product" can be obtained by the showing of the good cause, but privileged docu-
ments were formerly unobtainable regardless of good cause. Comment, The
Attorney-Client Privilege in Shareholders' Suits, 69 CoLUM. L. REv. 309, 315 n.29
(1969). The decision in Garner could well be read to put privilege and "work
product" on an equal footing.
"'Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 10, Garner v. Wolfinbarger, - U.S.L.W.
- (U.S. 1971).
"' FED. R. Civ. P. 34 was amended in 1970 to exclude the requirement of good
cause for the production of documents. When the deletion was originally proposed,
one of the reasons given was to elimnate uncertain and erratic protection to the
parties from whom production was sought. Advisory Committee on the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, Proposed Amendments to The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure Relating to Discovery, 48 F.R.D. 487, 526 (1969) (Advisory Commit-
tee's Note).
[Vol. 49
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be divulged will curtail freedom of consultation with legal advisers.4" The
Garner decision should have limited impact, since the privilege would be
denied only when a corporation is involved in a suit with its shareholders
and the shareholders can show "good cause" why it should not be ex-
tended. Since the need for counsel is still eminent, full disclosure by
honest management should not be affected.
MICHAEL D. MEEKER
Federal Estate Taxation-The State Street Trust Doctrine,
1959-1970: R.I.P.
In March, 1970, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit buried one
of the most vexatious concepts in the field of estate taxation. The court,
in Old Colony Trust Co. v. United States,- specifically overruled State
Street Trust Co. v. United States' by holding that "no aggregation of
purely administrative powers"8 would cause the corpus of a trust to be
included in the settlor's estate under sections 2036 (a) (2) and 2038 of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.4 In State Street the court held that
when a decedent-settlor had retained as trustee broad powers of admin-
istration which permitted him to exchange trust property without reference
to value, to invest in securities yielding either high income or no income
at all (specifically including wasting investments) and to allocate assets
to income or principal in all cases (whether state law as to proper alloca-
" See Comment, The Lawyer-Client Privilege: Its Application to Corporations,
The Role of Ethics, and Its Possible Curtailment, 56 Nw. U.L. REv. 235, 256-59
(1961).
1423 F.2d 601 (1st Cir. 1970).
263 F.2d 635 (1st Cir. 1959).
3 423 F.2d at 603.
'N T. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 2036(a) (2), 2038. Section 2036 of the Code in-
cludes in a decedent's estate property transferred to another in which the decedent
retained a life estate. Specifically included is property with respect to which the
decedent retained "the right, either alone or in conjunction with any person, to
designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income there-
from." This section is only applicable to transfers made after March 3, 1931.
Section 2036 includes the total amount of the property transferred. Section 2038
includes within a decedent's estate transferred property subject to the power of the
decedent to "alter, amend, revoke, or terminate, or where any such power is
relinquished in contemplation of decedent's death." It makes no difference under
section 2038 whether the decedent ever owned the property subject to the power;
it is only necessary that the decedent had the power on the date of his death or
had transferred it in contemplation of his death. Both sections 2 036(a) (2) and
2038 include property even if the power is exercisable only in a fiduciary capacity.
Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2036-1(b) (3), 20.2038(a) (1958).
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